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1 Scholars of intergroup conflict in India, particularly those studying Hindu-Muslim riots
and anti-Muslim pogroms, have long argued that attackers and their masterminds incite
violence for electoral and economic gain and later mask their instrumental calculations
in religious idioms (Wilkinson 2005). This argument has most forcefully been developed
by  Brass  (2006: 15),  who  divides  the  production  of  Hindu-Muslim  violence  in
contemporary  India  into  three  phases:  (1)  preparation/rehearsal,  (2)  activation/
enactment, and (3) explanation/interpretation. Brass (2006: 18) draws attention to the
cyclic ‘relationship between the immediate acts that precipitate riots and the ‘underlying
causes’ that make it possible for such acts to be followed by large-scale crowd violence’
and argues that this vicious circle becomes organised in ‘institutional riot systems,’ in
which ‘conversion specialists,’ who are well versed in instrumental calculations, ‘decide
when a trivial,  everyday incident will  be exaggerated and placed into the communal
system of talk, the communal discourse, and allowed to escalate into communal violence’
(Brass 2006: 32). Consequently, ‘riots persist because they are functionally useful to a wide
array of  individuals,  groups,  parties,  and the state authorities,’  but this  usefulness is
sustained because  of  a  ‘discourse  of  Hindu-Muslim communalism that  has  corrupted
history,  penetrated  memory,  and  contributes  in  the  present  to  the  production  and
perpetuation of communal violence in the country’ (Brass 2006: 33).
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2 Initially in a similar mode, this paper examines both an immediate act and the underlying
causes that enabled its escalation. It explains how a local business rivalry between Sunni
and Shi’a real estate developers in Lucknow went awry, leading to an attack on a Shi’a
majlis (religious  assembly)  in  the  inner-city  neighbourhood of  Wazirganj.  Yet,  unlike
other  instrumentalist  studies  of  intergroup  violence,  I  explore  what  happens  when
attackers’ calculations turn out to be miscalculations, thus questioning Brass’s notion of
‘institutionalisation.’ The Sunni attackers in Wazirganj apparently wanted to eliminate a
business rival  and dampen growing Shi’a economic and political  assertion,  which fits
instrumentalist assumptions. They did not, however, anticipate that their actions would
escalate to state-level politics and spiral so much out of their control as to temporarily
send them to jail. Their miscalculation demonstrates that the vicious circle of rehearsal,
enactment,  and interpretation is no quasi-mechanic automatism. Rather,  it  is  a more
complex phenomenon, in which creative agency and the entanglement of specific events
with broader social change play an important role (as Brass would likely agree). In the
case of  the ‘Wazirganj  Terror Attack,’  as  the event  soon became known,  a  distinctly
Muslim  version  of  ‘middle  class  moralities’  (Saavala  2010:  title)  took  on  sectarian
overtones and began to challenge the established clerical hierarchy. Besides immediate
instrumental  calculations,  this  paper  thus  also  unpacks  the cultural  changes
accompanying upward social mobility.
3 Most academic studies of intergroup violence in India and the role of social  mobility
therein have concentrated on the political and economic incentives for violence. This
paper complements that argument with close attention to the shifting ‘moral registers’
(Schielke 2009a, 2009b) of the emerging middle classes and thereby links those political
and economic incentives to the wider cultural undercurrents of social change. With an
emphasis  on morality,  I  wish to highlight  that  ‘middle class’  is  no neutral  economic
category delineated by economic aspirations and perhaps achievements, but primarily an
emic marker in which both those who belong and those who don’t invest meaning and
moral judgment. Indeed, I intend to show that it is precisely their moral projects that
deeply  implicate  the  middle  classes  in  the  violence that  they  outwardly  reject.  Self-
identified  middle  class  families  in  Wazirganj—Shi’a,  Sunni  and  non-Muslim  alike—
discursively  construct  themselves  as  the  guardians  of  propriety,  as  the  ‘clean’  and
utopian counterforce to both ‘corrupt’ and ‘criminal’ political and economic elites on the
one hand and the allegedly ‘unruly’ population of poor people on the other (Donner &
de Neve 2011,  Saavala 2010;  Liechty 2003).  Furthermore,  their  self-understanding  goes
beyond  rhetoric  in  that  it  is  underpinned  by  iconic  practices  such  as  conspicuous
consumption  and  related  practices  of  fashioning  the  ‘proper’  self.  Importantly,  the
intersection  of  class  with  other  social  categories  also  easily  results  in  exclusionary
political projects. This argument is not entirely new (see, for Lucknow, Gooptu 2001 and
Jones 2012 and see, more generally, Corbridge & Harriss 2000); however, as many of my
conversations with people in Lucknow have suggested, the disassociation of the middle
classes  from ‘dirty  politics,’  and more specifically  from sectarian violence  remains  a
prominent idea in popular imagination.
4 My argument is  based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Wazirganj  over a 16-
month period just prior to the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’ and during a one-month follow-
up visit conducted one year later. During these visits, I spoke with most of the people
involved on either side (one of the attackers was my Badminton partner a year earlier,
and I sipped many cups of tea with one of his victims) and with the administration, police,
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and clerical establishment. Although I was not present at the majlis that was attacked, I
had previously observed similar assemblies addressed by the same orator in the same
venue, examined official documents pertaining to the attack, and conducted extensive
participant and non-participant observation in the neighbourhood before and after the
incident.
5 The paper first introduces the Lucknow and Wazirganj social context and reconstructs
the attack using eyewitness  accounts,  press  reports,  and official  documents.  Then,  it
discusses some of the straightforward political and economic calculations that arguably
motivated the attackers. These motivations can explain the event itself but they cannot
address the rapid escalation that immediately followed it. The discursive significance and
political  impact  of  the  ‘Wazirganj  Terror  Attack’  can only  be  understood in  light  of
contentious projects of religious reform and an emerging middle class morality, which
are the focus of the second part of this paper. That section proposes that two conflicts
came to overlap in one incident: (1) the direct business rivalry between a Shi’a and a
Sunni  real  estate  developer  and  (2)  the  indirect  conflict  between  established  and
emerging  Shi’a  clerics  over  morality  in  modern  times.  The  attackers’  instrumental
calculations were miscalculations because they were ignorant of the latter conflict, as
became  evident  when  the  local  incident  spiralled  out  of  their  control.  The  paper
concludes  with  a  discussion  of  two  implications  of  this  analysis  for  the  study  of
intergroup violence in contemporary India more broadly:  (1)  intragroup contestation
often underlies intergroup conflict, and (2) instrumental calculations are fallible in lived
practice even if they appear stringent in retrospect.
 
Contemporary Lucknow
6 Contemporary Lucknow can be a strange place: It is neither a market town nor quite a
metropolis; it feels at once melancholic and vibrant, genteel and abrasive. Lucknow is the
capital  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  India’s  most  populous  and  politically  influential,  yet
economically struggling, state. As a city of historical importance, this spiritual centre of
sub-continental  Shi’ism  boasts  centuries  of  cosmopolitan  exchange  with  the  Persian
world. Consequently, Lucknow is the only city in India, apart from perhaps Hyderabad,
where Shi’a are politically and socially influential. Its colonial rulers, the Nawabs and
Taluqedars of Awadh, lavishly spent whatever they earned from British colonial purses
on poets  and craftsmen,  erotic  pursuits,  and culinary  refinement  (Sharar 1975).  Self-
identified proper Lucknowites, usually men with elitist pasts, elitist aspirations, or both,
still despise paid work. Every year, the old city grinds to a halt during Muharram and
Safar, the two months of Shi’a ritual mourning when no business can be conducted, no
engagements can be agreed upon,  no children can be named,  and no parties  can be
arranged. However, plenty of these activities happen under the carpet, contrived over
cups of Kashmiri chai before or after religious gatherings when rich and famous clerics
stop by for a chat and a deal.
7 Many residents of the old city enjoy recounting Lucknow’s glorious past to visitors, at
times in a smugly ironic performance of self-exotification. However, one cannot deny that
this  Lucknow of  gardens and palaces  is  in decline,  if  it  ever  did exist  for  a  broader
population (see Jones in this volume). In 1857, the city was the centre of what the British
termed the Great Mutiny and what many Indians today refer to as their First War of
Independence  (Llewellyn-Jones 1985).  Colonial  purses  were  stowed  and  traded  for
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imperial canes and carbines (Oldenburg 1984). Since the early 20th century, several waves
of heavy immigration reshaped the face of the city (Majumdar 2004) and independent
India’s land reforms cemented the elite’s financial decay. While the city always oscillated
between grandeur and melancholy, undoubtedly influenced by popular Shi’a piety and its
emphasis on ritual mourning, melancholy ultimately became pervasive. To complicate
matters, since the 1980s, Uttar Pradesh has been the grand stage for lower caste politics
in India, a scenario in which Dalits and Other Backward Classes profit and many Muslims
feel  excluded (Jaffrelot 2003,  Jaffrelot  & Gayer 2012,  see also Lee in this  volume).  Old
Lucknow largely keeps its distance from state-level politics, proud to host big leaders but
quick to point out that such ‘uncivilised’ people do not truly belong there (Graff 1997).
The sense that what remains is ‘just another provincial town, with little opportunities,
few jobs, and fewer women still’ was particularly apparent in the attitudes of my younger
informants. At first glance, little seems to be happening in this place where everything of
relevance allegedly happened long ago.
8 Yet, interestingly, expressions of Lucknow’s famous melancholy rarely feel melancholic.
Although outwardly looking back and claiming heartbreak over the city’s decay, most
people are quite busy looking forward and carving out opportunities in the new order.
Whereas  traditional  crafts  such  as  Chickan embroidery  are  in  decline  (Wilkinson-
Weber 1999) and positions in the burgeoning bureaucracy rarely go to Muslims (Sachar
et al. 2006), a new Muslim middle class is emerging on the fringes of the old city, largely
unmentioned in people’s  popular perceptions of  Lucknow. In sections of  the old city
where many Muslims (Sunni and Shi’a alike) are highly successful, a veritable real estate
boom is in progress because of perceptions that a proper ‘flat’ (a dwelling or apartment
always spoken of in English) is an important, although ambivalent, indicator of middle
class life (Guiu Searle 2014, Donner, forthcoming, Susewind, forthcoming). This real estate
boom propels a virtuous circle of upward social mobility and further tilts the economic
and political balance away from the former aristocratic elites.
9 Religious change is as palpable as the economic and political transformations in Lucknow
and a number of aspiring young ulema (clerics) propagate an individualistic morality for
the emerging middle classes (a fresh take on earlier reinventions of their role; Jones 2012,
Joshi 2001). Many people find it difficult to adjust to the ulema’s rigid demands, some
people find strength and solace in them, and others simply earn a fortune from spreading
checklists of  religious do’s and don’ts.  Indeed,  whoever wants to make money in old
Lucknow today either enters a shady world of builders and developers parcelling and
selling off the estates of the impoverished elite in collusion with local goons, politicos,
and city officials or works for one of the mushrooming religious cable television channels
or sectarian social media platforms. Frequently, a person does both, and more, by letting
one  brother  contest  local  elections  and  asking  another  to  run  the  declining  family
workshop.
10 Wazirganj, a mixed neighbourhood that is squeezed between the old and the new cities, is
in the midst of this imbroglio, and it is where I lived and worked for 17 months. Formerly
the  leafy  home  of  the  wazirs,  or  ministers,  of  Avadh’s  rulers,  the  neighbourhood’s
demography changed drastically  in  the  aftermath of  1857.  While  a  handful  formerly
aristocratic families remain,  reataining nostalgic memories of the past,  contemporary
Wazirganj is very much a crowded popular area on the brink of becoming middle class,
representative  of  the wider  changes  described above.  About  half  of  its  population is
Muslim,  divided into  one-third Shi’a  and two-thirds Sunni.  The Shi’a  have  grown in
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numbers and economic strength but the Sunni dominate local politics. Even though real
estate developers have recently invested money in the neighbourhood, the benefits of
social change are unevenly distributed along sectarian lines, which has led to increasing
tensions between successful Shi’a and powerful Sunnis. Last, but not least, Wazirganj is
highly political turf. It is the home of Christian College, where many young politicians
start  their  careers—mostly  Muslims  and  Hindus  despite  the  College’s  colonial-era
designation.  Christian  College  is  adjacent  to  Balrampur  Hospital,  where  criminal
legislators  go  to  escape the  hardships  of  jail.  The hospital  is  supported by  a  micro-
economy of assistants and small-scale political entrepreneurs, most of whom are Sunni
Muslim or Hindu cowherds close to the ruling Samajwadi Party—and locally known to
enforce their will by violent means if necessary (Michelutti & Heath 2012).
11 Indeed, violence between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims increased during the 20th century and
there was a series of sectarian riots in the old city that continue intermittently today.
Importantly, the use of the term ‘sectarian’ in this paper is based on the prevalent emic
descriptions of  Shi’a-Sunni  contestation,  but  I  do not  propose such contestations are
essentially about minute maslaki (school of thought) differences between them. To the
contrary,  ‘sectarianism  became  a  means  by  which  a  Shi’a  community  was  defined,
negotiated and presented, an alternative framework for collective modernization’ (Jones
2012: 230). Several authors have described this process of community formation as being
essentially similar to Hindu-Muslim communal agitation (Cole 1988, Freitag 1990). Similar
to the way that Hindu-Muslim conflicts often emerge from intra-Hindu disagreements
about what it means to be Hindu in contemporary times, ‘Shia-Sunni arguments . . . were
in fact frequently something of a smokescreen for competition, or even conflict, within
Shiism itself [so that] the ‘other’ was primarily a stylistic mechanism, by which particular
dynamics of change internal to Shiism could be facilitated’ (Jones 2012: 231). I agree with
this argument and endeavour in this paper to demonstrate that the miscalculations that
led to the escalation of the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’ came about mostly because of the
Sunni attackers’ ignorance of intra-Shi’a clerical politics.
 
The ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’
12 In recent years, a group of aspiring Shi’a real estate developers has begun to revitalise the
observance of Muharram, the Shi’a month of ritual mourning,  in the neighbourhood.
Over  the  past  few  years,  they  have  invited  Maulana  Abid  Bilgrami,  a  successful
businessman turned cleric,  to address the local  youth in a one-week series of  majalis
(religious assemblies). The size of the gathering has grown each year and it has been
particularly attractive to the emerging local middle classes. In 2013, it was so popular that
the local Sunni strongman, municipal corporator, and self-styled guardian of the poor,
named ‘Nammu,’ issued an ultimatum to stop Bilgrami’s majalis because he considered
them a public nuisance. The organisers refused to back off,  the resulting tension was
palpable, and, as Bilgrami was finishing his talk on 16 January 2013, somebody cut the
electricity.
13 As soon as ‘Doctor,’ one of the organisers, stepped out from the venue to find out what
was happening, he found Nammu at the front door and a heated argument ensued. Who
drew his pistol first remains unclear (police reports state that they both were armed);
but, in the midst of their dispute, several attackers opened fire at the swelling crowd from
a dark  corner  across  the  street.  About  fifteen  minutes  later,  the  District  Magistrate
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arrived with a heavy police presence just as three injured people, including Doctor, were
rushed to hospital. Police officers were busy dispersing the Sunni crowd and arranging
for the safe passage of the Shi’a from the place of attack when the news broke that a
Hindu  bystander,  apparently  mistaken  for  one  of  the  original  attackers,  had  been
murdered in a side alley. Simultaneously, one of the injured people (Doctor’s close and
trusted assistant) was declared dead on arrival at the hospital, where a large crowd, led
by Maulana Kalbe Jawwad (the most prominent Shi’a cleric in Lucknow), had already
formed in protest.
14 At this point, the focus of events expanded from Wazirganj to the old city at large. To
pacify the crowd that had gathered in front of the hospital, the authorities promised to
immediately arrest Nammu and his family members,  who had fled the scene. Indeed,
police captured one of his brothers early the next morning and put him to jail for two
weeks,  a  circumstance  unheard  of  in  the  history  of  that  family’s  hold  over  the
neighbourhood.  Meanwhile,  throughout  the  night,  stone  pelting  was  occasionally
reported. In the early morning hours after the attack, the District Magistrate tried to
negotiate to obtain a quiet funeral for the victims to avoid further tension. However,
Maulana Kalbe Jawwad’s major clerical rival foiled his plan by using one of the dead
bodies to block a heavily trafficked road through the old city and then demanding the
immediate arrest of the absconding Nammu and his cousin, who was a former Member of
Parliament (MP). When rumours flew that another Shi’a had been stabbed in the old city,
a Sunni rickshaw driver who was there at the edge of the roadblock became the victim of
a revenge attack. The police then cane-charged the protesters, dispersed the crowd, and
unilaterally took the dead bodies to a nearby graveyard, which triggered another wave of
protest.
15 Latest then, the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’ began to impact state-level politics. Four First
Informal Reports had already been lodged at the Wazirganj police station by the victims’
relatives,  a  co-organiser  of  the  majlis,  and  by  prominent  Shia  citizens.  They  named,
among others, Nammu, his arrested brother, and their MP cousin as the attackers. Chief
Minister  Akhilesh  Yadav,  his  father  and  Samajwadi  Party  supremo,  Mulayam  Singh
Yadav, became personally involved and assured Maulana Kalbe Jawwad that more arrests
would follow.
16 The next morning, barely 48 hours after the attack, the state government announced that
the families of the victims would be compensated five lakh rupees (roughly five times the
annual per capita income in urban Uttar Pradesh) and that there also would be payments
to those who had been injured. Nammu was briefly arrested but he was quickly cleared of
all  of the charges in a report hastily drafted by a police officer newly transferred to
Wazirganj  station.  Two weeks later,  Nammu’s brother left  jail  on bail  as  well,  which
prompted large demonstrations in the old city and a request to transfer the enquiry from
the local police to a Special Investigation Team (SIT) of the Anti-Terrorism Squad. The SIT
was indeed formed but it has not yet submitted its report. The Superintendent of Police
was promptly transferred out of Lucknow the day after he announced that stern action
would be taken.
17 The attack also caused a rather exceptional, albeit short-lived, unity among Lucknow’s
notoriously infighting Shi’a clerics under the leadership of Maulana Kalbe Jawwad. Later,
a Sunni procession was attacked during Ramadan in retaliation, a first in Lucknow’s long
history of sectarian clashes, and when I returned to the city 10 months after that attack
to ascertain what exactly was going on there, police pickets were still guarding sensitive
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street corners in Wazirganj. My Shi’a and Sunni contacts, including family members of
victims, attackers, and sources in the administration and police, confirmed what I had
gleaned from afar: the whole episode had quickly moved to higher political ground than
that  on  which  those  who  were  initially  involved  were  standing  and  any  prior
instrumental calculations by the attackers soon became irrelevant because a much larger
machinery sprang into action.
 
Politics and political economy
18 In short: the sectarian politics of identity and belonging that have come to be seen as
synonymous with contemporary Shi’a-Sunni relations in Lucknow seemed to have, once
again,  escalated  out  of  control.  The  movement  from the  alleged  decay  of  a  tehzeebi
(civilised) past into a violently sectarian future is the theme of many folktales about
Lucknow.  The  former  elites  often  blame  the  so-called  uncivilised,  lower  class  Sunni
migrants, so the initial interpretation of the sequence of events in Lucknow itself was
foreseeable.  The  Shi’a  wing  of  the  Urdu  press  and  many  sectarian  online platforms
quickly chose to frame the event as a ‘terror attack just like targeted killings [that have]
taken place in Pakistan [and] Syria’ (lucknowshianews.com, 19 January 2013). The Hindi
press also published articles about ‘sectarian clashes’ and speculated about the potential
electoral  motives  of  the  attackers.  The  dominant  perspective  in  the  Indian  English
language press was that a business rivalry had become violent, again suggesting potential
electoral  motivation.  The  latter  interpretation  reflects  the  dominant  scholarly
perspectives on intergroup violence in India that tend to deconstruct the shifting forms
of  religious belonging and try to explain violence through presumably hard political
calculations for economic gain (Brass 2006, Varshney 2002, Wilkinson 2005).
19 That the Wazirganj  incident might have been part  of an electoral  gamble and,  more
specifically,  an attempt to divide the so-called Muslim vote along sectarian lines had
already been discussed in Shi’a circles and in the wider community. At a large meeting of
Shi’a clerics on 4 February 2013, Maulana Kalbe Jawwad hinted at a political conspiracy
when he pointed out that, ‘political parties which [attempt to] foment trouble [that they]
should not underestimate the [electoral] strength of Shi’as, for also many Hindus, Sunnis,
Sikhs, Christians were azadars [mourners].’ In other words, observers of Muharram would
not accept attacks on majalis lightly and retaliate at the ballot box. Barely 24 hours after
the incident, one of Jawwad’s confidants posted the following online comment:
We should  consider  that  just  as  [Lalji]  Tandon [Lucknow’s  powerful  BJP  leader]
announced that
[Narendra] Modi [the controversial chief minister of Gujarat, and now India’s Prime
Minister] will fight elections from [a seat in] Lucknow, on the very same day . . .
preparations  began  to  destroy  the  unity  of  Sunni  and  Shi’a  [displayed  in  the
assembly elections] so that the BJP would win at the time of elections as always. One
more  important  issue  is  that  one  idiot  Shi’a  leader  and  15–20  boys  with  him
performed tabarra [curses against Sunnis] yesterday night at the Trauma Centre
and demolished a number of cars in nearby alleys. This is also part of this attempt
to incite  disunity.  In this  way,  one group of  Yazidis  is  paid well  from Tandon’s
pocket and throws oil in the fire. The command over both groups is in the hands of
one man. (lucknowshianews.com, 18 January 2013)
20 Unfortunately,  these  allegations  can  be  neither  proven  nor  disproven.  Lalji  Tandon
naturally denies his involvement and, even if we knew them, sectarian voting patterns
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cannot be linked to specific causes on the flimsy basis of temporal coincidence. There are,
however, good theoretical arguments that explain why, at least in this instance, electoral
calculations are an unconvincing explanation of sectarian violence. In January 2013, the
general elections were more than a year away and any strategy following a crude ‘divide
and rule’ logic would be ill-timed; an attack during the following Muharram would have
been  much  more  effective.  Moreover,  when  the  elections  took  place,  Muslims  in
Wazirganj  voted  similarly  to  those  in  Lucknow at  large  by  generally  supporting  the
Congress  (Susewind  &  Dhattiwala 2014),  which  had  never  had  an  investment  in  the
conflict between Nammu and Doctor.
21 Elections to the state assembly and municipality in turn were held months before the
attack,  in which Nammu and his  family were highly successful,  rendering a  revenge
attack from their side unnecessary. Indeed, in the assembly elections, Wazirganj was one
of the few areas in old Lucknow where Muslims rejected the Samajwadi Party’s sweeping
victory elsewhere, no doubt because Nammu had campaigned for the incumbent Bahujan
Samaj Party. In the local elections that were held shortly thereafter, Nammu’s powerful
grip on the neighbourhood led Wazirganj to be the only municipal ward that went to a
candidate uncontested for the second consecutive time. That candidate was Nammu’s
wife. To ensure that nothing unforeseen would happen, family members also controlled
the local  polling booth on election day with no apparent opposition from the police.
Nammu’s brother, who later went to jail for the attack on Bilgrami’s majlis, boasted to
have voted ‘at least 15 times’ when I met him by noon, and even half-jokingly invited me
(the foreign researcher) to cast a few votes in his sister-in-law’s favour (which I politely
declined). In sum, inciting sectarian tension for electoral gain was unnecessary at the
local level and premature at the national level.
22 However, politics might enter in a different way. Nammu and Doctor were both involved
in real estate, which is a sector that is believed to deeply influence election financing
(Kapur  &  Vaishnav 2011)  and  is  a  major  playground  for  goonda (strongman)  politics
(Michelutti 2010). Moreover, Imambara Deputy Sahib (the place of the attack) is located
on prime waqf (religious endowment) land. Before Doctor and the group of aspiring Shi’a
developers  around him began to  invigorate  Muharram observance  in  Wazirganj,  the
Imambara had almost  ceased to  function and had already been encroached upon by
Nammu and his associates. However, now that the place had returned to its original use,
further  deals  would  require  the  approval  of  Shi’a  developers.  Through  his  spiritual
activism, Doctor had therefore conveniently secured a share of the lucrative business,
circumventing the otherwise greater numerical strength and political power of his Sunni
competitors. During my last visit, it was indeed rumoured that Doctor had arranged a
land deal with some members of Nammu’s family but that all of them fell out with each
other shortly before the attack on the majlis.
23 How could a piece of land in old Lucknow have become so precious as to warrant murder?
To understand this, we need to detour into a discussion of the political economy of real
estate. A century ago, ‘a third of the members of the Municipal Board were ‘contractors’
. . . and clearly both the Board and the Improvement Trust were seen by many members
as a means of furthering personal, family and clique interests’ (Reeves 1997: 218). The city
has been expanding since then and many municipal corporators are still involved in real
estate. However, apart from a few large landowners, Muslims have benefited little from
urban growth. With the exception of a few old Muslim villages now enclosed by modern
suburbs,  new  Lucknow  has  become  almost  exclusively  non-Muslim  (see  Susewind  &
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Taylor  in  this  volume).  This  outcome  can  be  attributed  to  a  political  economy  of
bureaucratic collusion that creates economic incentives for Muslims to invest in the old
city: in the old city, Muslim developers enjoy closer social proximity to bureaucrats than
non-Muslims, possess greater electoral strength, and exert clerical control over religious
endowments,  all  of  which  translates  into  lower  bribe  levels  and  thus  higher  profit
margins  (Susewind,  forthcoming).  Higher  margins  in  turn  contribute  to  a  distinctly
Muslim, yet increasingly crowded, market segment in the old city, in which relatively
larger profit margins attract an increasing number of players.
24 In  Wazirganj,  Nammu  and  his  family  have  long  dominated  this  lucrative  market.
However, their former Shi’a contractors (Doctor and others) have recently made enough
money to become developers in their own right. They still cannot politically compete
with Nammu, but they are increasingly important economic competition in the scramble
to provide flats to the aspiring middle classes. The competition with Doctor over waqf
land might have been a warning sign for Nammu that his competition was attempting to
gain independence. Was this a potential motive for the attack? Locally it was common
knowledge that Nammu and his family used violence to protect their interests and that
they had escaped punishment in the past. Nammu may have attempted to kill two birds
with one stone by eliminating a major business rival while weakening the rising Shi’a
assertiveness in his neighbourhood. Thus, he may have been motivated to attack Doctor
immediately  following  the  majlis  rather  than  in  a  more  private  setting.  Apparently,
however, Nammu and his family grossly miscalculated their freedom to do as they chose
because the events rapidly escalated. The escalation suggests an underexplored aspect in
the research literature on inter-group violence in India: instrumental calculations might




25 Power  shifts  in  the  public  sphere,  corrupt  markets  and  Shi’a-Sunni  competition  for
upward social mobility set the context for the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’ and reveal some
of  the  material  incentives  and  restraints  under  which  it  occurred.  However,  these
conditions  cannot  fully  explain  why  a  business  rivalry  developed  such  violent
momentum.  To understand this  escalation,  one has  to move beyond the  individuals’
immediate instrumental calculations and examine long-term social changes unfolding in
the  neighbourhood  and  the  accompanying  intra-Shi’a  (clerical)  politics.  Nammu’s
ignorance, as a Sunni, of these developments led him to seriously misjudge the impacts of
his  actions,  a  misjudgement that  almost  sent  him to jail  for  a  long time despite  his
considerable political clout.
26 For instance, Nammu did not know that he and his family were not the only ones annoyed
at  Doctor  and  his  group.  Maulana  Kalbe  Jawwad  had  a  different  axe  to  grind.
Consequently, two conflicts came to overlap in space and time. There was the immediate
one between Nammu and Doctor and there was a more subtle and long-term one that
simmers in Lucknow’s Shi’a clerical landscape and reflects the wider social and moral
transformations  of  urban  North  India.  On  the  one  hand,  Jawwad,  had  complicated
interests in waqf administration himself. More importantly, however, he was increasingly
under pressure from young and energetic clerics (such as Maulana Abid Bilgrami, who
had been invited to Wazirganj by Doctor) who bring a different tonality and a different
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political project to the moral registers (Schielke 2009a, 2009b) of Shi’a belonging. They
particularly  strike  a  chord  with  the  new  Shi’a  middle  classes,  whose  allegiance
consequently  threatens  to  slip  away  from  the  clerical  establishment.  Therefore,  the
attack  on  Bilgrami’s  majlis was  a  perfect  opportunity  for  Jawwad  to  reassert  his
supremacy by rendering a local issue into a large-scale sectarian confrontation.
27 This section thus shifts to an analysis of Bilgrami’s theological project to explain the
reasons  that  he  became  a  threat  to  the  clerical  hierarchy  as  well  as  to  the
neighbourhood’s  poor,  most  of  whom happen to  be  Sunni.  I  argue that  the  cultural
undercurrents  of  social  change (exemplified by Bilgrami)  ultimately  explain why the
relatively better established Shi’a clerics attempted to gain control of the protests against
the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack,’ and, by extension, the rapid escalation of the issue to the
level of state politics. Similarly, the discursive significance that the attack acquired in this
process points to factors beyond the immediate instrumental calculations of Nammu and
his family—they may have wanted to get rid of Doctor, but surely not become associated
with ‘terror.’ This turn to the attacked assembly itself should not imply that the victims
were  in  any  way  responsible  for  what  happened  to  them—but  help  us  to  better
understand the limits of instrumentalist explanations of group violence.
28 What is so special about Maulana Abid Bilgrami? When I first heard one of his majalis in
Wazirganj one year before the attack, I was particularly struck by his rhetoric. He spoke
mostly  in  plain,  colloquial  Hindustani  rather  than  the  fairly  stylised  Urdu  that  one
commonly  hears  in  Lucknow.  He  frequently  inserted  key  terms  or  short  phrases  in
English, mirroring the linguistic practices of his largely lower-middle class audience. This
class tends to use select English nouns in their vernacular sentences, often to signal their
aspirations to participate in ‘Shining India,’ and perhaps also in some imagination of a
globalised modernity.
29 What Bilgrami said was just as interesting as his language and word choices and it was
indicative of middle class aspirations. Bilgrami avoided narrating the painful history of
Kerbala or engaging in a polemic portrayal of world politics, which is common among
clerics  in  Lucknow.  Instead,  he  mostly  took on the  minutiae  of  individual  practices,
especially public practices or those that are otherwise particularly visible to the public.
For example, the majlis that I attended began with a customary acknowledgement of the
piety of those who invited him. But, Bilgrami immediately reminded his audience that
akhlaq (everyday behaviour) was at least as important as ritual observance. In Wazirganj,
Bilgrami cautioned people not post pictures on Facebook, but if they did (as a male), to
make sure that they grew a beard first.  Similarly,  he exhorted his audience to avoid
‘mixed gatherings’ of boys and girls and called for greater respect for the dignity and
equality of men and women (in their respective roles). He asked us to stop listening to
popular  music  and  to  dress  ‘suitably’  in  modern  fashion  yet  he  allowed  marziya
(devotional music) and loose-fitting jeans. In all these examples, Bilgrami carefully carved
out ‘the delicate balance between not-too-much and not-too-little, between the vulgarity
of the poor and the vulgarity of the rich, [which] is endlessly negotiated in middle class
discourses of ‘suitability’ (Liechty 2003: 256).
30 Bilgrami’s  emphasis  on  the  everyday  and  mundane  kept  his  audience  engaged  long
beyond the official end of his majlis. Most of the people paid close attention throughout,
although a few continued to use their mobile phones and one friend even updated his
Facebook status during the talk, posting, ‘Maulana Bilgrami: don’t use fb [Facebook]’ to
silent giggles in the back row. However, despite subversive acts such as this, almost no
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one left before the end. Bilgrami hit a nerve. After he concluded the day’s program with a
short round of matam (ritual chest-beating), one of the organisers and friends of Doctor
stormed up to me and commented how useful he had found the detailed guidance that
Bilgrami provided, particularly for the many ‘youth’ (a term used exclusively in English
by both the organiser and Bilgrami) in the audience. Other short conversations that I had
as people trickled out into the night expressed similar sentiments.
31 To flesh out the theological reasoning behind Bilgrami’s insistence on the primacy of
akhlaq (everyday behaviour), I bought a video (VCD) recording of the complete How to help
our Imam series, based on its initial delivery at Khoja Masjid in Mumbai. It was sold in
Lucknow’s  bazaars one  year  later.  The  cycle  consists  of  eight  majalis,  each about  45
minutes long, the penultimate of which I had witnessed in Wazirganj. This is the series’
opening statement,
My topic for this whole Ashura is the help/victory of the Imam—that is, how to help
our Imam—which is the most important aspect of Muharram. After all, Muharram is
not the term for an activity, Muharram is not a culture of ours—Muharram is a prime
opportunity  for  introspection  for  Shi’a.  We  might  not  have  engaged  in
introspection our whole lives, we might not have thought about how we can assist
the Imam for the whole year, but this is the perfect opportunity, this is the time
that  our  neighbourhood  can  formulate  their  complaints  and  requests  and  can
jointly help those of Kerbala. So pay attention, friends, for this is an opportunity for
everybody,  everybody  can  grab  it,  everybody  will  get  the  chance! (VCD  1,  1:15,
emphasis in original)
32 Bilgrami again skilfully used English language words at key points. Indeed, the very first
words that he spoke were ‘meri topic ye hai ki’ (‘my topic is the following’), which is his
trademark  formulation  that  encapsulates  the  essence  of  his  distinct  style,  quoted
verbatim by most of the people who I asked about his majalis. The fact that he explicitly
constructed the cycle as a series of lectures under a unifying topic rather than according
to the events of Kerbala is another significant innovation. Although few orators refrain
from  contemporary  commentary,  equally  few  would  use  this  commentary  as  the
organising principle of their majalis, and the denunciation of a cultural understanding of
Muharram is highly significant in tehzeebi Lucknow. Finally, his introduction concludes
with  the  exclamation  that  ‘everybody  will  get  the  chance!’  (i.e.  the  chance  for
introspection and reform),  a  promise  that  he  made like  a  motivational  speaker  at  a
stereotypical marketing seminar, completely abandoning traditional rhetoric.
33 Many of my interviewees, particularly the young adults, said that the universalism in the
address  and  the  fleeting  casual  mention  of  women’s  education  mark  Bilgrami  as
particularly ‘modern’ and ‘progressive.’ Similar to other contemporary ‘modernists’ or
‘reformers’ (Osella & Osella 2007, 2013), Bilgrami ‘place[s] the responsibility of fashioning
Islamic society on each individual Muslim’ (Robinson 2007: 177).
34 However, Bilgrami also goes a step further because the Islamic society imagined here is
clearly middle class with complicated, and often ambivalent, desires to become ‘suitably
modern’  (Liechty  2003: title).  Dress  codes  and  Facebook  are  just  the  beginning  and
subsequent majalis guide the audience to the proper use of mobile phones, how to live a
suitably Islamic life in a nuclear family with a ‘job,’ in a ‘company,’ and how to protect
one’s Shi’a identity while aspiring to emigrate or relocate. With respect to all of these
indicators of middle class life, Bilgrami promised the audience a precise idea of ‘what all
to give up and what all to emulate’ to ensure a life in peace and zukun (calm) ‘despite the
demands of modern times’ (VCD 1, 11:30).
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35 There is more to this insistence on akhlaq, as becomes increasingly apparent throughout
the majlis series. For example, in his third lecture, Bilgrami complains that some of the
people  who listen to  his  majalis apparently  have musical  ring tones  on their  mobile
phones and then he makes an interesting remark about social status and class distinction,
Music is forbidden in Islam. If you ever listen to music, well, don’t complain, don’t
complain then. Listen carefully! Four days have passed since I arrived in Bombay. Five
days perhaps. Day in, day out, my phone rings, I keep meeting poor people. All of
them have one request: ‘Maulana, I am troubled, I have this problem, that problem.’ I
regularly reply: oh come on my friend, [leave it], at least in Muharram, at least in
the month of Imam Husain. . . . Whenever you encounter troubles, then you have to
check yourself, check: ‘am I doing something wrong?,’ is there a chance that I myself
have done something wrong? Everybody should check first themselves, then their
family, their relations, their talk and their actions. . . . There is a simple method,
everybody can use it,  men and women,  even labourers  and watchmen.  I  myself
check everyday . . . and if you want to know, if you really want to know, . . . then first
check yourself, check 24/7! (VCD 3, 28:00, emphasis in original)
36 This excerpt and similar remarks in subsequent majalis reveal the flip side of an ethical
life imagined purely in terms of propriety, which Saavala (2010: title) fittingly termed
‘middle-class morality.’ Considering the example of Hyderabad, she argues that
the central moral predicament of the Indian middle classes is not how to justify
one’s  own  privileged  position,  because  they  do  not  feel  a  need  for  such  a
justification in the absence of a universal moral code. Rather, the main moral issue
at stake is how to defend one’s own position as ‘one of us,’ how to be on a par with
one’s status equals by pointing out the moral differences between ‘the poor’ and
oneself as a middle class person. (Saavala 2010: 118)
37 Associating poverty with moral misconduct is not uncommon in India and elsewhere.
However,  with respect to an Islamic cleric,  it  is  nonetheless surprising,  given Islam’s
central  theological  concern  with  social  justice.  Indeed,  Bilgrami’s  emphasis  on  each
individual’s responsibility for the minutiae of his or her conduct is driven by a political
economy of guilt that helps him to reinterpret the key Islamic commandment of equality
and social justice in favour of a narrow middle class politics of the self: ‘If we do not
implement this . . . how can we be called Hussaini? . . . Change your life, change it! Kerbala
means  revolution,  but  [most  precisely]  a  revolution  in  one’s  own  life.  Revolutionise
yourself!’ (VCD 3, 39:00).
38 In  sum,  Abid  Bilgrami  not  only  mimics  the  linguistic  practices  of  his  middle  class
audience (a distinct style for which he is well known) and focuses his rhetoric on iconic
consumer  items,  he  precisely  addresses  the  material  sensitivities  of  the  aspirational
classes in Lucknow and elsewhere. Ultimately, Bilgrami naturalises privilege and limits
social responsibility by effectively blaming poor people for their own predicament. If one
were to assist them, one would effectively encourage them in their bad ways. Thus, he
promotes a model of upward social mobility in which ethics are reduced to a code of
propriety, a list of moral do’s and (especially) don’ts for individual conduct.
39 Bilgrami’s approach is such a strong innovation of mainstream Islamic perspectives on
social justice, solidarity and charitable obligations that it is not surprising that tensions
have erupted regarding the extent to which his advice is being followed. The organisation
that invited Bilgrami to Wazirganj continues to distribute food to the poor every year on
one of the first days of Muharram, awards stipends to deserving Shi’a students, and runs
a  blood  donation  camp  that  receives  about  60  donations  before  and  after  each  of
Bilgrami’s programs. But while some people who have attended them merely appreciate
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that Bilgrami’s majalis have a clear structure, a ‘modern style’ as one visitor told me, a
refreshing alternative to the ritualistic approach of other orators, there also is my friend
who left his wife in part because of arguments about which practices were proper enough
to label their young family as ‘educated rather than poor,’ as he once framed it. Since
then, he has fancied books on divorce. Other people fully commit to and happily embrace
the theory that poverty is of no concern to them, that individual propriety is key, and
that poor people themselves ‘have to check themselves, check: am I doing something
wrong?’
40 So far, this narrow focus on propriety remains an exception in the wider Shi’a clerical
landscape of Lucknow, and even Bilgrami’s most ardent followers acknowledge that other
clerics are more influential.  Broadly speaking, these clerics either pursue a project of
identitarian groupism (exemplified by the politics of Maulana Kalbe Jawwad), aesthetic
refinement  (most  celebrated  by  Maulana  Agha  Roohi  but  also  discernable  in  many
smaller, traditional neighbourhood majalis), or social reform (propagated by Maulana
Kalbe Sadiq and his associates). None of them breaks as clearly with traditional rhetoric
as Bilgrami, nor do they address a specific class base in their considerable following. But
all strive to attract the newly rich, not least to secure their own income; consequently,
the considerable impact of Bilgrami’s innovations on the emerging Shi’a middle class in
Wazirganj suffices to make the establishment nervous,  as several of those mentioned
above admitted in private conversation. In fact, I believe this was the main reason for
Kalbe Jawwad’s intervention in the aftermath of the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’ and its
subsequent escalation in the first place, as argued above.
41 A second reason, however, is the fact that Bilgrami’s middle class morality also easily took
on sectarian overtones in Wazirganj, where most of the poor people are Sunnis and Shi’a
lead  the  scramble  for  upward  social  mobility.  Although  it  may  not  have  been  his
intention,  his  theology  is  particularly  susceptible  in  this  social  context  to  sectarian
instrumentalisation. Many people on the Sunni side with whom I spoke 10 months after
the attack on his majlis explicitly referred to the rising real estate prices and diminishing
rent markets in Wazirganj to justify it. Although these types of complaints were at least
partly motivated by Sunnis’ competing business interests rather than concerns for poor
people  (an  aspect  discussed  more  fully  in  Susewind,  forthcoming),  the  complaints
demonstrate  that  Bilgrami,  who  rose  to  local  prominence  in  an  intra-sectarian
competition over what it means to be Shi’a in contemporary times, began to influence




42 This entanglement of religion and class has wider implications for the study of intergroup
violence  in  contemporary  urban  India,  implications  with  which  I  will  conclude  this
discussion. On one hand, the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’ cannot be understood in isolation
from the local politics and the political  economy in which it  occurred. Nor can it  be
understood without considering the business rivalry between Nammu and Doctor over a
lucrative segment  of  Lucknow’s  booming real  estate  market:  without  the threat  that
growing  Shi’a  wealth  poses  to  Sunni  political  dominance  in  the  neighbourhood,  the
‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’ would likely not have happened. This reinforces mainstream
scholarship that seeks to explain communal and, by extension, sectarian violence in India
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through  political  instrumentalisation  and  economic  incentives  (Brass 2003,
Varshney 2002, Wilkinson 2005).
43 On the  other  hand,  I  have  argued that  such political  and economic  calculations  are
underpinned by cultural and religious idioms that nurture and sustain those calculations
over time. Unfortunately for Nammu, his conflict with Doctor became entangled in the
wider social and moral dynamics that were expressed more within the Shi’a community
of Wazirganj than between Shi’a and Sunni. In recent years, a reformist perspective on
middle class morality has gained prominence in Wazirganj, a variation of Shi’ism that
reduces Islamic ethics of social justice to a checklist for individual propriety. This middle
class morality quickly became clothed in sectarian overtones because most poor people
are Sunni and simultaneously challenged the established Shi’a clerical hierarchies that
have so far resorted to differed moral registers, thus drawing the attention of state-level
politics to an otherwise local problem.
44 The  ‘Wazirganj  Terror  Attack’  therefore  demonstrates  that  the  rapid  discursive  and
political escalation of violent conflict between groups can often only be understood by
deeply examining the rivalries and contestations that occur within groups. Moreover, we
saw that  intergroup violence may well  emerge from instrumental  calculations which
appear stringent in retrospective reconstruction—but that these calculations are fallible
in lived practice.
45 Finally, when close attention is paid to the reasons why miscalculations occur, we see that
intergroup conflict is not exclusively (perhaps, not even primarily) a situation in which
underprivileged, uneducated people are easily manipulated by vicious elites for political
and economic gain. Local discourse in India still situates the middle classes as a clean and
civilised  counterforce  to  political  and  economic  elites  perceived  to  be  corrupt  and
criminal on one hand and seemingly unruly popular politics on the other hand. Many
Lucknowites attribute Shi’a-Sunni conflict to a lack of education and autonomy of the
poor Muslims in the old city, people who have been exploited by unscrupulous political
entrepreneurs. In contrast to these popular perceptions, however, is a growing body of
academic literature that links upward social mobility to at times violent othering and
argues that these links are frequently mediated through novel moral registers (Schielke
2009a, 2009b) and associated practices (Ahmad 2009, Ghassem-Fachandi 2012, Ring 2006,
Verkaaik 2004).  These  types  of  connections  are  not  necessarily  new  phenomena.  In
Lucknow, the links can be traced back to the early 20th century when sectarian clashes
first began and were financed by the emerging business class of the time (Hasan 1997).
Reeves  (1997: 221)  suggested that  from the very beginning,  ‘urban concerns  [such as
poverty and development] may have been displaced onto the ‘sectarian’ because of the
class position[s] of Shi’a and Sunni groups’ (cf. Gooptu 2001, Jones 2012). Seen through the
prism of the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack,’ there is no difference today: group violence may
not be ancillary but indeed integral to the processes of social change in contemporary
North India.
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ABSTRACTS
On 16 January 2013, a Sunni real estate developer opened fire at a Shi’a religious assembly in
Wazirganj, a mixed neighbourhood in old Lucknow, India, killing one and injuring two. At its
core, this was a business rivalry gone awry, but was soon labelled the ‘Wazirganj Terror Attack’
by  Shi’a  activists.  Demonstrations  were  staged,  politicians  were  arrested,  and  religious
gatherings were invigorated. Based on 17 months of ethnographic fieldwork, this paper considers
why the attack took place and why it escalated. The political economy of real estate and local
politics are argued to have motivated the attack, but the attackers miscalculated and lost control
of  the  incident.  The  subsequent  escalation  can  only  be  understood  in  light  of  Shi’a  clerical
competition  over  new  moral  registers  and  an  emerging  middle  class  morality  that  replaces
ethical  concern  for  solidarity  with  narrow  codes  of  ‘proper’  conduct.  This  underlines  the
importance  of  intra-group  contestation  to  intergroup  conflict,  and  the  limits  of  purely
instrumentalist explanations of sectarian violence.
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